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Abstract
In I3orm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn and Tijs (1992) the compromise value
is introduced as a solution concept on the class of compromise admissible NTU-
games. Two characterizations of the compromise value are provided on sub-
classes of NTU-games.
'I'his note shows that in one of thes~ characterizations the axiotns are depen-
dent. It turns out that with a small weakening of the symmetry property thc
axioms become independent. Moreover, a new characterization of tlie compro-
mise value is provided.
Further, it is shown that these characterizations can be extended to a larger
class of NTU-games. Finally, all monotonic, Pareto optimal, and covariant
values on this class of NTU-games are described.1 Introduction
Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn and Tijs (1992) introduced the compromise value
as a new solution concept for a large class of NTU-games. The comprornise value
by dc(inition cxl,cnds t,hc r-va.luc for'1'l1-gamcs ('I'i.ls (1981)) and thc Ii.aiffa-Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution (ILKS-solution) for bargaining problems (Ii,ailfa (1953), Kalai
and Smorodinsky (1975)) to NTU-games. Two characterizations of the compromise
value show that also axiomatically the compromise value generalises the solution con-
cepts nicnt,ionc,d abovc.
In section 2 0l' this uotc it is shown that in onc of the charactcrizations of thc cornpro-
mise value provided by Borm et aL (1992) the axiom system is dependent. We show
that by weakening the (strong) symmetry property, the original characterization of
the compromise value can be adapted in such a way that the axioms are independent.
Moreover, we obtain a new characterization of the compromise value, which is similar
to one of the characterizations of the MC-value introduced in Otten, Borm, Peleg,
Tijs (1994).
In the characterizations of the compromise value discussed in section 2 a non-levelness
condition plays a crucial role. Section 3 illustrates that this condition can be weak-
ened in order to obtain a characterization on a larger class of NTU-games. We use a
similar technique as Peters and Tijs (1984) who extended Thornson's (1980) axiom-
atization of the RKS-solution to a larger class of bargaining problems by weakening
the non-levelness condition.
Finally, section 4 characterizes the set o[ all monotonic, Pareto optimal, and covariant
values on this class of NTU-games using monotonic curve solutions as introduced by
Peters and Tijs (1984).
2 The compromise value
We start, wit,h some definit,ions. !1 non-transJeraóle utility gayrce or NTII-garrte is a pair
(N,V), whcrc N is a finite scó o( playcrs and V is a map assigning t,o oach coalition
.5 E 2N ~{~l} a~ subset V(S) of IL` of ctllrlirenGlc payo,(}~veclors. Wc asstunc 1.haL for
each ~i E N there exists a real nurnber v(i) such that V({i}) -{x E II. ~~ G v(i)}.
1Furthcr, wc assurne that, for cach .S E 2N ~{(~i} the following properties hold
(i) V(.4) is a. non-c~nipty, closcd and coinprchc~nsive subsel. of l~s
(ii) V(S) fl {x E RS ~ x; 7 v(i) for all i E S} is bounded.
An N'1'U-garrre (N, V) is often identified with V.
Let V be an NTiJ-game. For each S E 2N `{~}, let
dom(V(S)) :- {x E RS ~ x G y for some y E V(S)}
wdom(V(S)) :- {x E RS ~ x G y, x~ y for some y E V(S)}.
The elements of (w)dom(V(S)) are (weakly) dominated by the coalition S in the
game V. Elements of V(S) `dom(V(S)) are called weakly Pareto optinaal in V(S)
and elements of V(S) `wdom(V(S)) are called Pareto optimal in V(S). The core
of (!~',V), denoted by C(V), consists of all payoff vectors attainable for the grand
coalition N which are noL dorninated by any coalition S.
Let i E N. The utopia payof~ for player i, It;(V ), is defined by
Ií;(V) :- sup{t E R ~~QERx~{~} : (a,t) E V(N),a ~ dom(V(N ~{i})),a ~(v(j))~EN~{;}}.
By assurnption ( ii) in the definition of an NTU-game it follows that lí;(V) G oo.
However, it might happen that Ii;(V) --oo. We will restrict ourselves to NTU-
games (N,V) for which lí;(V) E R for all i E N. The vector Ií (V) :- (Ií;(V))iEN ~s
also called the upper value of V.
Let i E N and let S E 2N with i E S. 'I'he re~nainder of i E S is given by
pv(s,i) :- sup{t E R ~~aEfts~~.~ :(a,t) E v(s),a ~(x~(V))~ES~{~}}.
The nzinirnal right of player i is denoted by
k;(V ) :- max p~(S, a),
S:iES
and the vector k(V) :- (k;(V));EN is also called the lower value of V. Note that
k;(V) ) v(i) for all i E N, but it might happen that k;(V) - oo for some i E N.
2Again, we will restrict ourselves to NTU-games (N,V) for which k(V) E RN.
The compromise value is defined on the class of compromise admissible NTU-games.
An NTU-game (N,V) is called compromise a.dmissible if
k(V) c lí (V), and k(V) E V(N), K(V) ~ dom(V(N)).
It is easy to show that for a compromise admissible game ( N,V) the assumption
K(V) ~ dom(V(N)) implies that K(V) ~ wdom(V(N)). By CN we denote the class
of all compromise admissible NTU-games with player set N. It is shown by Borm et
al. (1992) that an NTU-garne with a non-empty core is compromise admissible.
A value on CN is a map f: CN ~ RN, which assigns to each V E CN a payoff
vector. For a compromise admissible N'I'U-game (N,V) the compromise value 'l(VJ
is defined as the unique vector on the line segment between k(V) and lí(V) which
lies in V(N) and is nearest to the utopia value Ií(V), i.e.,
T(v) :- k(v) ~ a~(x(v) - k(v)),
where
a,, :- max{a E[o, i~ ~ k(v) ~- ~(x(v) -~(v)) E v(N)}.
Borm et al. (1992) show that the characterization of the two player ItKS-solution by
Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) can be extended in order to provide a characterization
of the compromise value. In order to illustrate this result we first need some notation
and definitions.
l;or vectors ~, y E R`v and a subset C C RN, we define ~~,y :- (x;y;)iEN and
a,~C:-{x~c~cEC}.
Let (N, V) be an NTU-game, ~ E R~~ and Q E RN. The NTU-game (N, a~ V-~ ~i)
is defined by
(cY ~ V f Q)(S) :- ~s~ V(S) -f {~s} for all S E 2N.
l~l`I~ ,-~N
~~,.N
.l.Ild Il`I, I : ~lw -a ~~.N b~` :1. Vallll` UII rÍN.(i) f is callr~d I'arelo oplimolon A~ if f(V} E V(N)~wdunt(V(N)) forall V E AN.
(ii) f is called weak Pareto optintal on AN if f(V) E V(N) ` dom(V(N)) for all
V E AN.
(iii) f is syntrnetric if f;(V) - f~(V) for all V E AN and all i, j E N which are
symmetric in V. Here, players i, j E N are called symmetric in V if
(1) for all .S C N` {i,j}, all ~: E V(.S U{i}) it holds t.hat ,y E V(S U{j}),
where ,y E Rs"{'} is defined by y~ -.x; and ys - a,s,
(2) for all S C N, i, j E S and all a, E V(S), we have y E V(S), where y E Rs
is defined by y; -~~, y~ - x; and ys`t~,~} -~s`{t,~}.
(iv) f is strongly symmetric on AN if for all V E AN and all i, j E N with k;(V) -
k;(v),x;(v) - r~,(v), we have f;(v) - f,(v).
(v) f is monotoaic on A~ if for all V,W E A~ with k(V) - k(W),lí(V) - K(W)
and V(N) C W(N) we havc f(V) C f(W).
(vi) f satisfies covariunce on AN if for all V E AN, all ~ E R~t and all Q E RN we
have f(cY~V fQ)-a~ f(V)~~.
On the class of compromise adrnissible garnes the compromise value satisfies all prop-
erties mentioned above, except Pareto optimality. This is shown in the following
example.
Example 2.1 Let N:- { 1, 2, 3} and define V by
V(.S):-{.rE1~s~:rCO} fora.IISE2N`{N,N},
V(N) :- compr(conv{(4,0,0), ( 4,3,0), (2,4,0), (0,4,0), ( 2,3,2), (0,3,2), ( 0,0,4)}).
Here, for a set C E RN, compr(C) denotes the comprehensive hull of C and conv(C)
denotes the convex hull of C. The reader easily verifies that K(V) -(4,4,4) and
k(V) -(0, 0, 0). So, V E C~ and T(V )-(2, 2, 2). But (2, 2, 2) E wdom(V(N))
since (2, 3, 2) E V(N). Hence, the compromise value is not Paret,o optimal on G'N.
Borrn et aL (1992) characterize the cornpromise value on the set CN C CN of all
compromise admissible games (N,V) satisfying
4(A) the boundary of t,he set V'(N) :- {:c E V(N) ~ x~ k(V)} contains no segments
parallel to a coordinate hyperplane, i.e., V'(N) is non-level
(B) k(V) ~ Ií(V)
(C) (kN~t;), lí,(V)) E V(N) for all i E N
(D) V(N) is convex.
We now krave
Theorem 2.2 (Borm et aL (1992))
The corupromise value is the unique value on CN which satisfies weak Pareto opti-
rnality, strong symrnetry, monotonicity and covariance.
Of course, in this characterization weak Pareto optimality can be replaced by Pareto
optimality since for a game V E CN all weak Pareto optimal points in the set V'(N)
are Pareto optimal.
However, in this characterization the monotonicity property is superfluous. This
is a consequence of
Theorem 2.3 The compromise value is the unique value on CN which satisfies
Pareto optirnality, strong syrnrnet,ry and covariance.
Prooj. Clearly, the compromise value satisfies the properties mentioned above on
CN. Let f: CN -~ RN satisfy the three propert,ies, and let V E CN. We show that
f(V) - T(V).
Let V' :- V- k(V). Clearly, V' E CN and k(V') - O.Moreover by (B), Ií(V') -
K(V)-k(V) ) 0. Definc ~ E R.N by ~; :- ( k;(V'))-r for all i E N. Then a 1 0. Let
W:- ~~ V'. 'l'hcn W E C`N and k(W) -.~ ~ k(V') - 0, Iï (W) -.~ ~ K(V') - cN,
where e~ E R~ denotes the vector with cN - 1 for all i E N. St,rong symrnctry
of f and the 7' implics f;(W) - J~(W) for all i, j E N and 'I;(W) - 7~(W) for a.ll
i., j E 1V. From Parcto opt,itnality oF f and the T it follows that f(W) - T(W'). Since
V- K(V') ~ W~ k(V) covariance of f and T implies f(V) - T(V). O
.5Note that in thc proof of this theorem we did not use the conditions (C) and (D). So
theorem 2.3 holds on the larger class of compromise adrnissible NTiJ-games satisfying
(A) and (B).
Theorem 2.3 is similar to one of the characterizations of the MC-value which is in-
t,roduced in Otten et aL (1994).
In fact, the proof of thcorem 2.2 provided by 13orrn et al. (199`L) shows the fol-
lowing characterization of the compromise value on CN in which strong symmetry is
replaced by symmetry.
Theorem 2.4 The conrpronrise value is the unique value on CN which satisfies
Pareto optimality, symmetry, monotonicity and covariance.
It is left to the reader to show that in theorem 2.1 all properties are indcpendent.
3 Characterizations on a larger class of NTU-
games
'I'he assumpl.ion of non-Ievelness plays a crucial role in the characterizations of Lhe
previous section. We will show that by modifying this assumption one can obt,ain a
characterization of the compromise value on a larger class of compromise admissible
NTU-games. This modification is based on Peters and Tijs (1984), who extended
Thomson's (1980) characterization of the RKS-solution to a larger class of bargain-
ing problems by weakening the assumption of non-levelness.
We restrict attention to the class CN of all cornpromise admissible N'I'U-games with
player set N satisfying (B)-(D) and, in addition,
(E) for all x E V'(N) and all i E N we have: if x E wdonz(V(N)) and x; C Ií;(V),
then there exists an f ~ 0 such that, x-h ee' E V(N).
llere, e` E RN denotcs the vector with e~ - 1 if i- j, aud e~ - 0 otherwise.
Clearly, if V"(N) is non-level, then V"(N) also satisfies (E).
fiNot.e tha.t ihe N'I'[1-gainc providcd in cxarnple l does uol, satisfy (G). This is an
imniecííate conseyuence of I,he following lenmia which shows I,hat I,he comprornise
value is Pareto optimal on the class CN.
Lemma 3.1 Lci V E CN. 'I'hcn 7'(V) E V(N) `~~dom(V(N)).
Proof 13ecause of covariartce of f and "I' it is sufficient to prove that f(V) - T(V)
for all V E CN wit.h k(V) - 0 and lí(V) - e~ (see the proof of theorern 2.3). So, let
V E CN with k(V) - and I((V) - eN. The compromise value of V is an element of
the line segment through 0 and e~. We rnust prove that T(V) E V(N)~wdom(V(N)).
We disf.ingiiisli Lwo casc~s.
Olivioiisly, if 'I'(L') - r~, tlien 'I'(V) E V(N) ~ tu~lunt(V(N)). Now suEifiose LhaL
'l'(V) ~ cN aud Lhat '!'(V) E~iudorn(V(N)). '1'heu 1'(V) G c`v - lí (V), and so
by assumption ( 1J), it follows that for each i E N there exists an e, ) 0 such that
T(V) f ete` E V(N). Take e:- min{e; ~ i E N}. By comprehensiveness of V(N) it
follows that Í'(V) ~- ee' E V(N) for all i E N. Using convexity of V(N) we obtain
that T(V) f ~~,~e~ E V(N). Ilence, T(V) E dom(V(N)), which contradicts the weak
Pareto optimality of T. Hencc;, T(V) E V(N) ~ wdom(V(N)). ~
Now we can forrnulate
Theorem 3.2 The cornprornise value is the unique value on CN which satisfies
Parcto opl,iniality, synunctry, rnonol,onicit,y anci covariance.
!'roof ('Ica.rly, t,he coniproniise valuc~ sat,isfics t,hc four propertic~s ment,ioned above on
CN. Now let f: CN -~ 1~.~ sal,isfy the four properties. We provc that f(V )- T(V )
for all V E CN.
Because of covariance of f and T it is sufficient to prove that f(V) - T(V) for all
V E CN with k(V) - 0 and I1(V) - eN (see the proof of theorem 2.3). So, let V E CN
with k(V) - and h(V) - eN. Then T(V) is an element of the line segment through 0
and eN. Using the assumptions (C) and (ll) we have that ronv{e` ~ i E N} C V(N),
so T(V) ) ~N~e'v.
Now consider the NTU-game (N,W) defined by
7{:cE It'ti~~:rCO} il'S'E2N`{{D,N}
com~r(cortv({e' ~ i E N} U{T(V)})) if S- N.
Obviously, fí(W) - eN, and k(W) - 0. Hence, W E CN and assumptions (B)-(ll)
are satisfied. If T(V) - eN, then W(N) - corrzpr{eN}. Otherwise, if T(V) G eN,
then W(N) is non-level. In both cases (E) is satisfted, so W E CN. Clearly, T(W) -
T(V). Using symmetry of f it follows that f;(W) - f~(W) for all i, j E N. So, by
Pareto optimality of f and T it follows that f(W) - T(W). Hence, T(V) - f(W).
Since, W(N) C V(N), k(V) - k(W), and K(V) - [í(W), it follows by rnonotonicity
of f t,}:at, f(W ) C f(V ). Henc;c:, T(V ) G f(V ). But then Pareto optimality of T
irnplies that T(V) - f(V). ~
4 The class of monotonic, Pareto optimal and co-
variant values on CN
Theorem 3.2 characterizes the compromise value as the unique value on CN which
satisfies Pareto optimality, monotonicity, covariance and symmetry. In this section
we drop t.he syrnmetry property and characterize all Pareto optirnal, monotonic and
covarianl, solutions on the class CN. I~or t,his, we use similar tcchniques as Peters and
`l'ijs (198~) who charactcrizcd all l'areto optimal, rno~rotonic, and covariant bargain-
ing solutions on a large class of bargaining problems, using monotonic curve solutions.
Because we consider covariant values on C~ attention can be restricted to the class
Cór of NTU-games V E CN which satisfy Ií(V) - eN and k(V) - 0(cf. the proof
of t,heorern 3.2).
Using monotonic curves one can define monotonic and Pareto optimal values on the
class C~~.
A rranreolo~rr,ic curve (Peters and 'l'ijs (198~)) is a map y: [1, ~N~] ~[0, 1]~ with
(i) y is increasing, i.e., ry(s) 1 ry(t) if s? t, and
(~~) ~;EN -y,(t) - 1 for all t E [l, ~N~].
~Note that (ii) irnplies that, y(1) E corzv{e` ~ i E N}, and ry(~N~) - eN. Moreover, it
can easily be checked that eac6 monotonic curve is continuous.
Let 7 be a monotonic curve. '1'hen ry gives rise to a value fry on Cor in the following
way: for V E Cór define f~(V) as the unique Pareto optimal point of V(N) lying on
the curve {ry(t) ~ 1 G t G ~N~}. It can easily be verified that fti is well-defined on Cór
(c.f. Peters and rI'ijs (19~34)). f~ is called tlce value corresponding to líee m.onotonic
cvcrve y. 'I'hc r~~adcr c~asily vcrifies that f~ is rnonotonic and Paret,o opt,imal.
Clearly, each J~" cau be exteuded to a rnonotonic, l'areto optirnal and covarianL value
on CN in a unique way.
We now have tlre following characterization.
Theorem 4.1 Let f: CN -~ R.N be a value on CN. Then f satisfies Pareto opti-
rnality, rnonotonicity and covariance if and only if f- fry for some monotonic curve
ry : [l, ~N~] -' [0, 1]N.
Proof Clearly, if f- f~ for some rnonotonic curve ry, then f satisfies the reyuired
properties. Conversely, let f satisfy Pareto optimality, monotonicity and covariance.
We const,ruct y:[l, ~N~] -~ [0, 1]N as follows.
I~'or ! E[I, ~N~], I~,t y(l) :- f(l~), whcrc~ V~, is I,hc hI'l'U-garnc dc[incd hy
~~ {a~ER~ti~:rCO} if.SE2~~{(n,N}
~',~(.5') :
corn.Err({ar E RN ~ 0 G:r C c~~, ~,EN r; G l}) if .S - N.
'lhe reader easily verifics that, !t (V~) - e~, k(V~) - 0 and that V~ E C~ for every
t E[1, ~N~]. Further, by Pareto optimality and monotonicity of f it follows t,hat -y
satisfics (i) and (ii). So ry is well-defined. Note that
f(V~) - f~(Vr) for all t E [1, ~N~]. (1)
We want to prove that f- f7. In view of covariance of f and f~ it is sufircient to
prove that f(V) - f~(V) for all V E CN with K(V) - eN and k(V) - 0.
Let V E C'N satisfy Ií(V) - eN and k(V) - 0. Let t :- ~iENfi (~~), and let W be
the NTtJ-game defined by
g( {~ERS~~CO} ifSE2N`{~,N}
W(S) :- Sl V(N) ~ Vr(N) if S- N.
Then W E CN and K(W) - eN and k(W) - 0. Clearly, f"(W) - f"(V) - f"(Vt).
Iience, by (1)
.i"(V ) - f(Vt). (2)
Using monotonicity of f, we have f(LV) C f(Vi), and f(W) C f(V), and by Pareto
optimality of f it follows that
f(W) - f(V~) - f(V~~ (3)
Combining ( 2) and ( 3) we can conclude that f(V) - f"(V). O
I'rorn thc proof of Lhcorctn 9.1 i1, follows I,haL thcrc exists a uniyuc nronotonic curvc
7" :[1, ~N~] -a [0, 1]N such LhaL f"~ is symmetric, namely, -y'(t) :- ~ N~eN for all
t E [1, ~N~]. Clearly, f"~ - T, so theorem 4.1 provides an alternative proof of theo-
rem 3.`l.
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